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ASSIGNMENT-DUTY OF ASSIGNOR To AsSIGNa.--The defendant entered into
a contract with the Dominion Sugar Company of Ontario, Canada, for the pur-
chase of 2,000 tons of sugar at 9.5 cents per pound. The sugar was to be
delivered in New York. Later he contracted to sell to the plaintiff, an agent
for a foreign corporation, 1,750 tons of the same sugar at 1o.5 cents per pound.
The Dominion Sugar Company had no knowledge of this agreement. The Cana-
dian Goverment placed an embargo on sugar and the Dominion Company applied
to the defendant for a release from its contract. This was granted upon the
payment of a large consideration. The defendant refused either to deliver the
sugar to the plaintiff or to indemnify him. The plaintiff sued for the difference
between the contract price and the market price at the time fixed for delivery.
Held, that, viewing the original transaction between the plaintiff and the def end-
ant as an assignment pro tanto, the plaintiff could recover. Gray & Co. v.
Cavalliotis (1921, E. D. N. Y.) 276 Fed. 565.
It would be a breach of good faith for an assignor to destroy a contract right
already assigned. In re Ellington Planting Co. (1912) 131 La. 654, 6o So. 25.
Hence an assignor who collects a debt which he has previously assigned is a
constructive trustee for his assignee. MacDonald & Graham v. Kneeland &
Luddington (i86i) 5 Minn. 352. Especially is this true in the case of partial
assignments. Hinkle Iron Co. v. Cohen (192o) 229 N. Y. 179, 128 N. E. 113;
see COMlMENTS (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 395. An unwarranted interference
with the contractual relations existing between an assignee and the original
obligor might be considered a tort. See Lumley v. Gye (1853, Q. B.) 2 El. & Bl.
216; Temperton v. Russell [1893, C. A.] I Q. B. 715. -So also a quasi-contractual
recovery might be had on the ground of unjust enrichment if the assignor
releases for a consideration, as in the instant case. The court based its decision,
however, on the ground that the defendant had broken an implied contract not to
release the original obligor. Some courts have reached the same result in similar
cases without indicating the specific theory upon which the recovery was allowed.
Hubbard v. Prather (i8o8, Ky.) I Bibb. 178; Executors of Willson v. Winit
(I8O4, S. C.) 2 Bay, 517. In one case the court did not refer to an implied con-
tract, but apparently allowed a recovery on that ground. Alston v. Gillespie
(1887) 78 Ga. 665, 3 S. E. 562. The more fully considered decisions, however,
definitely recognize that any act of the assignor destructive of the assignee's
rights is a breach of an implied contract. Ward v. Audland (1847, Exch.) 16
M. & W. 862; Aulton v. Atkins (1856, C. P.) 18 C. B. 249; Gerard v. Lewis
(1867) L. R. 2 C. P. 305; see also Sanders v. Aldrich (1857, N. Y.) 25 Barb. 63.
Implied contracts are "obligations arising from mutual agreement and intent to
promise but where the agreement and promise have not been expressed in words."
I Williston, Contracts (192o) sec. 3. To hold that an assignor must not interfere
with the rights of his assignee seems to be a legitimate application of this defini-
tion. The cause of action being for breach of contract, the damages would be
measured by the injury suffered by the assignee. A similar result would be
reached if the plaintiff sued in tort, but in quasi-contract he would recover the
amount of the consideration of the release. In so far as the decision in the
principal case relates to the point here discussed, it appears to be the first direct
American authority.
CONFLICT OF LAws-BILLS AND NoTEs-APILICABILITY OF FOREIGN REVENUE
LAws.-Suit was brought in New York on an unstamped negotiable promissory
note executed in London and made payable in New York. The defendant denied
[771]
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liability on the ground that the lack of a stamp rendered the note void under
English law. Held, that the validity of the note depended upon the law of the
place where it was payable. Beadall v. Moore (1922) i99 App. Div. 53', 191
N. Y. Supp. 826.
It is generally held that the formal requirements of bills and notes which are
payable at the place of execution are governed by the law of the place where
they are made. Conner v. Elliot (1920) 79 Fla. 513, 85 So. 164; Lorenzen,
Conflict of Laws as to Bills and Notes (1917) 35. Applying this theory, some
courts have held that if the absence of a stamp renders a note void at the place
where it is made, it is void everywhere. Satterthwaite v. Doughty (1853) 44
N. C. 314; Fant v. Miller (1866, Va.) 17 Gratt. 47. Notes which are payable at
a place other than the place where they are made have been considered as not
within the rule of the lex loci contractus. Their validity is controlled by the law
of the place of payment. McCabe v. Williams (192o, N. D.) 177 N. W. 378;
Brozmn v. Gates (I9O4) 120 Wis. 349, 98 N. W. 205; see Story, Bills of Exchange
(4th ed. i86o) 144. It seems that the rule of the lex loci solutionis should apply
also to bills and notes in which the place of execution and payment coincide,
since the term "place of payment" includes the place of making. The rules laid
down in the above cases and the instant decision appear to be based upon the
theory that the validity of the instrument depends upon the law of the place with
reference to which the parties intended to contract. See Zinmerman v. Brown
(1917) 30 Idaho, 640, 166 Pac. 924. Inasmuch as modern commercial conditions
require a definite, consistent rule, it would probably be more desirable to hold a
negotiable instrument valid, in so far as form is concerned, if it complies wit
the law of any state with which the contract has a substantial relation, than to
make its validity depend upon the presumed intention of the parties. This rule
should be applied if the lack of a stamp renders the note invalid at its inception.
If the absence of a stamp, however, has no effect upon the substance of the
instrument, but merely affects its admissibility in evidence, the defect is generally
disregarded by the court of the forum as a mere procedural requirement of
another jurisdiction. Westlake, Private International Law (5th ed. 1912) sec.
2o9; Hibbert, International Private Law (1918) 132, 133. The court based its
-decision in the instant case partly upon the ground that no territorial effect should
be allowed to foreign revenue laws, a principle which seems open to criticism.
Lorenzen, op. cit. 44; but see Foote, Private Internatioial Jurisprudence (4th
ed. 1914) 358. t
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWV-REVOCATION OF LICENSE OF FOREIGN CORPORATION )FOR
REMOVING SUIT TO FEDERAL COURTS-UNCO4STITUTIONAL CoNDITIONs.-The plain-
tiff, a Missouri corporation, licensed to do business in Arkansas, brought an
original suit in the federal court of Arkansas and also removed to the same court
a suit brought against it. A statute required the Secretary of State of Arkansas,
the defendant, to revoke the license of a foreign corporation that invoked the
federal jurisdiction. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the revocation. Held, that
an injunction should be granted. Terral v. Burke Construction Co. (1922) 42
Sup. Ct. 188.
The instant case, expressly overruling two previous decisions, and definitely
establishing the rule that a state cannot, compel a foreign corporation to refrain
from removing suits: to the federal jurisdiction, should settle a controversy of
long standing, which had its origin in the case of Paul v. Virginia (1869, U. S.)
8 Wall. 168, and which has given rise to considerable uncertainty. The broad
language of that case allowed complete freedom, to the states in their treatment
of foreign corporations not within the scope of the commerce clause. A state
could exclude such corporations entirely and" thus could impose any conditions
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whatever upon their admission. To prohibit a foreign corporation from bring-
ing suit in a federal court was a familiar condition. The court soon realized
that the doctrine as expressed in the Virginia 6ase was too broad, and hence
gave effect to an earlier statement to the effect that qualifications for the admis-
sion of foreign corporations must not be "repugnant to the constitution or laws
of the United States." Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French (1856, U. S.) IS How. 404,
4o7. Consequently it was held that an agreement not to remove to the federal
courts was a violation of the corporation's constitutional privilege and that the
corporation could repudiate such an agreement. Insurance Co. v. Morse (1874,
U. S.) 2o Wall. 445. When the question was raised again, however, the court
wished to avoid the Morse case, and yet not overrule it. The result reached was
that a state could not enforce a contract not to remove a suit, but could punish
the corporation by expulsion if it availed itself of this constitutional privilege.
Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. (1877) 94 U. S. 535. To overcome this dilemma,
the court later held that a law imposing such a condition was void and of no
effect. Barron, v. Burnside (1887) 121 U. S. 186, 7 Sup. Ct. 931, This should
have ended the controversy, but in the case of Security Mutual Ins. Co. v. Prewitt
(19o6) 2oo U. S. 446, 26 Sup. Ct. 314, aff'd (i9o6) 2o2 U. S. 246, 26 Sup. Ct 619,
the court reverted to its previous decision in the Doyle case and held that a state
could expel a corporation for not complying with the condition. This decision
was again unsatisfactory and was gradually broken down. Harrison v. St. Louis
& San Francisco Ry. (1914) 232 U. S. 318, 34 Sup. Ct 333; Henderson, Posi-
tion, of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law (1918) chs. 6, 8.
It was not until the instant case that the Doyle and Prewitt cases, subjected to
much criticism, were expressly overruled with no attempt made to distinguish
them. It may be hoped that the rule is finally settled.
CORPORATIONS-NEGLIGENCE-STOCK CERTIFICATE SIGNE IN BLANK BY OFFICERS
AND SToLEN By E PLO.m-Stock certificates signed in blank by the president
and treasurer of the defendant corporation were left in the custody of its transfer
agent. A clerk who assisted the transfer agent and had access to the certificates,
abstracted one, filled it out in his own name, forged the name of the registrar
of the corporation, and pledged it to the plaintiff as security for a loan. The
loan not having been paid and the corporation having refused to transfer the
stock on its books, the plaintiff sued to recover damages for the loss sustained.
Held, (two judges dissenting) that the plaintiff could not recover. Hudson
Trust Co. v. American Linseed Co. (1922) 232 N. Y. 350, 134 N. E. 178.
The doctrine that a corporation is liable for fraudulent issues of certificates
of stock made by its transfer agent is well established in this country. V. Y.,
N. H. & H. Ry. v. Schuyler (1865) 34 N. Y. 30; Allen v. South Boston Ry.
(1889) 15o Mass. 2oo, 22 N. E. 917; but see Moores v. Citizen's Nat. Bank
(1884) In U. S. 156, 4 Sup. Ct. 345. It has no application to the instant case,
however, since the particular clerk was not clothed with general authority to
issue stock. The liability of the corporation was invoked on the ground that it
was negligent in making the issuance of the certificate possible. Certificates of
stock are quasi-negotiable instruments, and where the owner entrusts them to
an agent for a prescribed purpose and the agent pledges them as security for a
loan to himself, the owner is estopped to assert his ownership. National Safe
Deposit Co. v. Hibbs (1913) 229 U. S. 391, 33 Sup. Ct. 818; Union Trust Co. v.
Oliver (1915) 214 N. Y. 517, io8 N. E. 8op On the other hand, where a servant
simply has access to a certificate in the possession of the owner and steals it, the
owner may. reclaim the certificate from innocent purchasers. Knox v. Eden
Musie Americain Co. (1896) 148 N. Y. 441, 42 N. E. 988. The instant case falls
within the latter principle. Possession of the certificates was entrusted to the
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transfer agent and not to the clerk who assisted him and who merely had access
to the certificates. See Schumacher v. Greene Cananea Copper Co. (1912) 117
Minn. 124, 134 N. W. 51o. The fact that the name of the registrar on the face
of the certificate was forged is another reason for the result. The certificate
was not genuine and the corporation could not be liable even if negligent. Dollar
Savings Fund & Trust Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (i9o6) 213 Pa. 307, 62
AtI. 916.
COVENANTS-COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND-PRIVILEGE To TERMINATE
A LEAsE.-The defendant was the lessee of certain premises under a fifteen-year
lease commencing May I, 1913. The lessor had reserved the privilege and power
of terminating the lease at any time subsequent to May I, 1920, provided the land
should be sold in good faith and $5,o0o paid to the tenant. No reference was
made to heirs or assigns. The lessor was seventy-three years of age when the
lease was executed. The plaintiff, an assignee of an assignee of the lessor, sued
to eject the defendant under this provision of the lease. Held, that the plaintiff
should have judgment. 507 Madison Ave. Realty Co. v. Martin (1922, App. Div.)
192 N. Y. Supp. 762.
A covenant is said to run with the land when it is of such a kind that the duty
to perform it or the right to enforce it will pass to an assignee of an interest in
the land by mere force of the conveyance and without express assignment of the
covenant. Gerling v. Lain (1915) 269 Ill. 337, lO9 N. E. 972; Miller v. Clary
(1913) 21o N. Y. 127, lO3 N. E. 1114. But a covenant can run only if the parties
so intend, and if it is of such a nature that the law will permit it to run. I
Tiffany, Real Property (192o ed.) 179. If it appears from the lease that the
parties intend the covenant to run, assigns need not be mentioned, at least when
the covenant concerns something in esse. Hadley v. Bernero (19o2) 97 Mo. App.
314, 71 S. W. 451; 15 C. J. 1244. The leading case held that covenants run with
leasehold estates only when they touch and concern the land. Spencer's Case
(1583, K. B.) 5 Co. Rep. 16a. In order to touch and concern the land a covenant
must affect the mode of enjoying the thing demised, its nature, quality, or value,
independent of collateral circumstances. Congleton v. Pattison (18o8, K. B.) 1O
East, 13o; Ventnor Investment & Realty Co. v. Record Development Co. (1911)
79 N. J. Eq. lO3, 8o Atl. 952. Or it must be beneficial to the owner of the estate
in his capacity as owner. Vernon v. Smith (1821, K. B.) 5 Barn. & Aid. I;
Dyson v. Forster [19o9, H. L.] A. C. 98. Collateral covenants are those which
are beneficial to the lessor or the lessee irrespective of his relation to the premsies,
and do not pass to assignees. Vyvyan v. Arthur (1823, K. B.) I Barn & Cress.
410; California Packing Corp. v. Grove (I92I, Calif.) 196 Pac. 891. Usually a
covenant will not comply with one requirement unless it complies with the other
also, and if it successfully does this, it is reasonably safe to assume that it
touches and concerns the land. Abbot, Covenants in a Lease which Run with
the Land (1921) 31 YAIE LAw JOURNAL, 127, 135. Covenants have been further
classified according to the legal relations created between the parties. Under
this classification, those which beneficially affect the reversionary interest of the
lessor by making more valuable or increasing his powers as reversioner touch
and concern the land. Mason v. Smith (1881) 131 Mass. 51 (covenant to pay
taxes on the demised premises) ; Standard Oil Co. v. Slye (1913) 164 Calif. 435,
129 Pac. 589 (covenant giving lessee power to renew the lease) ; see also Abbot,
Leases and the Rule Against Perpetuities (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 878,
885; cf. Hollander v. Central Metal & Supply Co. (i9o8) lO9 Md. 131, 71 At.
442; and contra, Woodall v. Clifton [1go5, C. A.] 2 Ch. 257 (covenant to pur-
chase the reversion) ; Purvis v. Sherman (1916) 273 Ill. 286, 112 N. E. 679 (cove-
nant to purchase improvements) ; Garelik v. Rennard (1921, Sup. Ct.) 116 Misc.
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352, 19o N. Y. Supp. 371 (covenant giving the tenant a privilege of pre-emption).
See in general Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases (914) 12 MICH. L.
REv. 639, 645. In the principal case the court easily found from the attending
circumstances, including especially the lessor's age, that the parties intended the
covenant to run. Furthermore, the covenant seems to have been of the kind that
the law will permit to run.
CRimiNAL LAW-MANSLAUGHTER BY MEANS OF WOOD ALCOHOL COGNIZABLE IN
JURISDICION WHERE ORIGINAL PURCHASE OccuaD.-The defendant purchased
wood alcohol in Kings County, New York, with the intention of selling it for
beverage purposes. He transported it to New York County where he bottled
and sold it to a customer through whom it found its way to Massachusetts, where
some of it was purchased and used as a beverage by the deceased. The New
York Code defines manslaughter as a homicide committed without a design to
effect death by a person committing a misdemeanor. N. Y. Cons. Laws, igog, ch.
88, sec. io5o. Committing a public nuisance--the unlawful doing of an act which
endangers the health or safety of a considerable number of persons-is a mis-
demeanor. Ibid. ch. 88, sec. 153o. The Code provides further that a crime
perpetrated partly in one county and partly in another shall be subject to the
jurisdiction of either. The defendant, convicted of manslaughter in Kings
County, contended on appeal that no part of the crime of manslaughter had been
committed in Kings County. Held, that the conviction was proper. People v.
Licenziater (i921, N. Y.) 199 App. Div. io6.
At common law a homicide, the component parts of which take place in dif-
ferent jurisdictions, is cognizable only in the jurisdiction where it is consummated.
State v. Hall (1894) 114 N. C. gog, ig S. E. 6o2; Larremore, Interstate Crime
and Interstate Extradition (1899) 12 HARv. L. REv. 532. In New York, how-
ever, the Code removes this seeming conflict of claim to jurisdiction as between
counties. N. Y. Laws, 1881, ch. 442, sec. 134; Code of Crim. Pro. sec. 134.
Moreover no difficulty would arise from the fact that the death occurred outside
of the state, for under the code crimes partly committed within the State are
punishable. N. Y. Cons. Laws, i9o9, dh. 88, sec. i93o; see also People v. Botkin
(1908) 9 Calif. App. 244, 98 Pac. 861. The instant case presents the difficulty of
determining where the crime of manslaughter occurred. Obviously the homi-
cide was an offence in Massachusetts and could have been punished there if
extradition had been possible. Hyatt v. Corkran (19o3) 188 U. S. 691, 23 Sup.
Ct 456. New York County, moreover, could have assumed jurisdiction, since
the defendant, by his sale of a beverage which he knew to be dangerous, com-
mitted an unlawful act that proximately caused death. Cf. Thiede v. State
(1921, Neb.) 182 N. W. 570. Was there, however, sufficient causal connection
between the defendant's act in Kings County and the death in Massachusetts to
justify the conclusion that a part of the crime of manslaughter was committed
within the jurisdiction of the Kings County court? If the acts of the defendant
in Kings County and New York County were parts of one transaction, if the
diversion of the poison from an industrial use, harmless to life, to use as a
beverage dangerous to life, was one continuing public nuisance under the broad
statutory definition the decision is dearly sound. But the defendant was guilty
only of a misdemeanor in Kings County if the purchase and transportation were
separate and distinct from the sale, that is, if they were conditions precedent to,
rather than causes of, the sale. Cf. People v. Rockwell (1878) S9 Mich. 503.
This, it is submitted, is the logical view, but the question is so fine that the instant
case may be supported upon the ground that no sufficiently valid doubt can be
raised to justify a denial of jurisdiction to a court that obviously carried out
manifest justice.
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DAMAGES-MITIGATION-BENEFIT RECEIVED FROm THIRD PARTIE.-In an action
to recover damages for personal injuries, the trial court refused to allow the
defendant to show, in mitigation of damages, that the plaintiff's medical expenses
had been paid by his employer, and that the plaintiff was insured against loss
from the payment of hospital bills. Held, that there was no error. Roth v.
Chatlos (1922) 97 Conn. 282, 116 Ad. 332.
Where the plaintiff has had' to undergo the expense of nursing and medical
attendance, it is well settled that he can recover the reasonable value of such
service from the defendant. Vicksburg & Meridian Ry. v. Putnam (1886) 118
U. S. 545, 7 Sup. Ct. I. But there is a decided difference of opinion on the
question of whether there can be any recovery when the plaintiff has not been
obliged to pay for these services. Thus, if the plaintiff has been attended by
members of his household without compensation, some jurisdictions make no
allowance therefor in damages, the theory being that he has suffered no damage
and therefore has no basis for a claim against the defendant. Gibney v. St. Louis
Transit Co. (19o7) 2o4 Mo. 7o4, 1O3 S. W. 43; Goodhart v. Pennsylvania Ry.
(1896) 177 Pa. 1, 35 Atl. I9I. Other courts, however, following what seems to
be a better rule, permit a recovery; they refuse to allow the defendant, a wrong-
doer, to be benefited by the generosity of members of the plaintiff's household.
Varnham v. The City of Council Bluffs (1879) 52 Iowa, 698, 3 N. W. 792. The.
same rule should apply when a third person, in a spirit of benevolence, has borne
this expense for the injured party. Denver & R. G. Ry. v. Lorentzen (1897,
C. C. A. 8th) 79 Fed. 291; contra, Peppercorn v. The City of Black River Falls
(1894) 89 Wis. 38, 61 N. W. 79. Where the plaintiff had previously insured
himself against the consequences of a future accident the defendant should not
be entitled to have the insurance considered in mitigation of damages. The
insurance "came to the plaintiff from a collateral source, wholly independent of
the defendant, and which as to him was res inter aIlios acta." Regan v. New
York & N. E. Ry. (1891) 6o Conn. 124, 22 Atl. 503. Apparently the existing
conflict in the authorities is due to the failui-e on the part of some courts to
recognize the fact that the defendant is under a duty to furnish the plaintiff with
such medical service as is necessary to effect a cure; and that the defendant has
no interest whatever in any sum that the plaintiff may receive from some third
person. See I Sedgwick, Damages (9th ed. 1912) sec. 67; 67 L. R. A. 87, note.
GIF S-BANiK ACCOuNTs-EvIDiNCE NECESSARY TO INDICATE DONATIVE INTEN-
TioN.-Miss Fell, a depositor in the defendant bank, caused her account to be
changed from her own name to "Fell or Jordan, pay either or survivor." Miss
Fell died, and Jordan, claiming as donee, sued through the bank to recover the
balance of the account. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover. Maine Say-
ings Bank v. Welch (1921, Me.) 115 Atl. 545.
The question of what constitutes sufficient evidence of an intention to make
a gift of a bank account has been the cause of considerable confusion. By the
weight of authority the fact that the deposit is in form if the name of the donor
and the" alleged donee raises no presumption of a donative intention. Barstow v.
Tetlow (1916) 115 Me. 96, 97 Atl. 829; Colmary v. Fanning (1915) 124 Md. 548,
92 Atl. 1O45; contra, Blick v. Cockins (i916) 252 Pa. 56, 97 Atl. 125. The reason
usually advanced is that the transfer should be considered as having been made
merely for the convenience of the donor unless another purpose is clearly indi-
cated. Hayes v. Claessens (1919) 189 App. Div. 449, 179 N. Y. Supp. 153. The
courts are almost evenly divided on the question of whether a donative intention
may be indicated without a delivery of the bank book. Apparently the better
view is that it may. Marston v. Industrial Trust Co. (1919, R. I.) 1o7 Atl. 88;
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Kennedy v. McMurray (1915) 169 Calif. 287, 146 Pac. 647; contra, Matthias v.
Fowler (1915) 124 Md. 655, 93 Ati. 298. As suggested by the cases adopting this
view, the argument that the donor, by retaining the bank book, may withdraw
the money and thus nullify the gift seems untenable, since, if there has in fact
been a valid gift, the donee would have the same power. Industrial Co. v.
Scanlon (1904) 26 R I. 228, 58 AtI. 786. Another view is that the depositor, by
thus changing the form of the account has, upon the theory of a novation, made
a new contract with the bank whereby the donor and donee become joint tenants
and the bank undertakes to pay either. Deal's Adm'r. v. Merchants' Savings Bank
(1917) 120 Va. 297, 91 S. E. 135; Chippendale v. North Adams Savings Bank
(1916) 222 Mass. 499, 111 N. E. 371. If the parties have agreed in writing as
to he conditions upon which the bank is to hold the money, it is easy to-ascertain
whether there has been a gift. Chippendale v. North Adams Savings Bank, supra.
The confusion in the decisions seems to result from a failure to distinguish
between acts necessary to constitute a delivery under the technical requirements
of gifts inter vivos, and acts indicative of a donative intention. In many states
statutes provide that if a deposit is made in form payable to "either or survivor,"
there is a presumption of a joint tenancy. Conn. Gen. Sts. 19x8, ch. 204, sec. 3999;
N. Y. Laws, 1914, ch. 369, sec. 249; Matter of Delmore (1916) 174 App. Div. 99,
16o N. Y. Supp. 62. This result seems desirable. The instant case seems sound,
inasmuch as the evidence indicated an attempt to make a testamentary disposition
and not a gift. McCullough v. Forrest (1914) 84 N. J. Eq. 1ol, 92 Atl. 595.
INFANTS-CoNTRACTS-REPUDIATION OF CONTRACT BENEFICIAL TO INFANT.-
By misconduct an infant apprentice forced his master to discharge him and then
sued to recover damages for wrongful dismissal. The lower court found that the
apprentice, by his misconduct, had repudiated the contract, and that the master
had accepted the repudiation. Held, that if the repudiation was not for the benefit
of the infant, judgment should be for the plaintiff. Waterman v. Fryer (1921,
K. B.) 38 L. T. R 87.
It is settled in England that an infant is bound by a dontract for service if, as
a whole, it is beneficial to him. King v. Inhabitants (1824, K. B.) 3 Barn. & Cress.
484; Broinley v. Smith [i9o9] 2 K. B. 235; see De Francesco v. Barnum (189o)
L. R. 45 Ch. Div. 43o. The American rule is that infants are bound in quasi-
contract for necessaries; specific contracts are voidable. See (1915) 24 YALE
LAw JOURNAL, 344; I Williston, Contracts (192o) sec. 24o; Anson, Contract
(Corbin's ed. igig) 171, note I. From the rule that an infant is bound by a ser-
vice contract beneficial to him, the English courts have arrived at the conclusion
that he cannot repudiate such a contract unless the repudiation is for his benefit.
King v. Inhabitants, supra. Upon the formation of the contract of apprenticeship,
the infant incurred the duty to serve and obtained the right to be taught, the
master obtaining the correlative right to service and incurring the duty to teach.
The master may enforce his rights against the infant. Gadd v. Thompson [1911]
I K. B. 304; see also Clemnents v. London N. W. Ry. [18941 2 Q. B. 482, 491.
The reason for holding an infant bound by a beneficial contract of service is
the desirability that he be employed. Had he the power to destroy his duty
by disaffirmance, masters would not employ him as an apprentice. Clements v.
London N. W. Ry. [1894] 2 Q. B. 482, 495; Coke, Littleton, *172a. But this does
not apply to repudiation or rescission. There the infant yields the right and is
relieved of the duty. The master being willing, there seems to be no reason why
the infant may not, by agreement, surrender the right. He may lose it by leaving
the master. Hughes v. Huinphryes (1827, K. B.) 6 Barn. & Cress. 68o. He may
forfeit it by criminal conduct. Learoyd v. Brook [1891] I Q. B. 431. The instant
case, holding a benefit essential to an infant's repudiation, represents an unneces-
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sary step in the zeal of the law to protect infants, and incidentally reveals the
variance between the common-law rule of America and that of England with
reference to such contracts.
INSURANCE-WAvER AND ESTOPPEL-MI.ITARY CLAUSE.-An agent of the
defendant insurance company represented to the insured that the clause in the
policy which provided for the payment of a higher premium by persons in military
service would not be enforced. A policy was taken out in reliance upon this
representation, and the defendant company, in an action on the policy, set up the
failure to pay the higher premium as a forfeiture. Held, (two judges dissenting)
that the defendant was estopped to set .up such a defence. Sovereign Camp,
W. 0. W. v. Richardson (i921, Ark.) 236 S. W. 278.
The instant case offers an excellent example of how courts become confused in
the application of the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. Although the distinction
is recognized by most courts there is a tendency to misapply and disregard it.
As the right of the insured to recover may depend upon whether the facts con-
stitute a waiver or an estoppel, it often becomes vital to determine which doctrine
is applicable in a particular case, as, for example, where there is a provision in
the policy limiting the power of an agent to waive a condition. Vance, Insurance
(1904) 343; Jones v. Savizn (1916, Del.) 96 AtI. 756; Redstrake v. Cunberland,
etc. Ins. Co. (1882) 44 N. 3. L. 294- In most state courts, if the agent of the
insurer misrepresents existing or past facts, or if the insurer knows of facts which
it may plead as a forfeiture, but nevertheless issues to the insured a policy which
is represented as valid, the insurer is estopped from setting up the forfeiture.
Andrus v. Md. Ins. Co. (19o4) 91 Minn. 358, 98 N. W. 2oo; Welch v. Fire Assoc.
(1904) 120 Wis. 456, 98 N. W. 227; see Grand View Bldg. Assoc. v. Northern
Ass. Co. (19o5) 73 Neb. 149, 1o2 N. W. 246. Estoppel, therefore, involves the
element of deceit and- is tortious in its basis. In order to be effective, the mis-
representation must relate to a present or past fact and must have the effect of
inducing the insured to act in reliance .upon it to his prejudice. The parol evidence
rule is not involved and the result does not depend upon considerations of waiver
or contract law but upon the simple equitable principle of estoppel in pais. Ins.
Co. v. M11owry (1877) 96 U. S. 544; Home Ins. Co. v. Wilson (1913) iog Ark.
324, 159 S. W. 1113; contra, Northern Ass. Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Assoc. (19o2)
183 U. S. 308, 22 Sup. Ct 133; Md. Cas. Co. v. Campbell (1920, C. C. A. 5th)
255 Fed. 437. Waiver is the "voluntary relinquishment of a known right." Vance,
op. cit. 343. It is contractual in its nature in that the insurer consents to relin-
quish the right in question .and the insured assents to such relinquishment It is
generally held that parol evidence is not admissible to prove a waiver prior to,
or contemporaneous with, the completion of the contract Such would clearly be
obnoxious to the parol evidence rule. Lasch v. V. Y. Life Ins. Co. (1915, Sup.
Ct) 92 Misc. 190, I55 N. Y. Supp. 255. Where, however, the alleged waiver
occurs after the issuance of the policy, parol evidence is admissible to establish a
subsequent parol modification of the existing contract Ins. Co. v. Norton (1877)
96 U. S. 234; Caledonian Ins. Co. v.Snith (1913) 65 Fla. 429, 62 So. 595. In
the instant case there was no estoppel because there was no misrepresentation of
an existing or past fact. There was'a mere promissory statement that the military
clause would not be enforced. There was, in effect, an attempt to waive by
parol a condition in the policy before it was issued, and, in view of the parol
evidence rule, the plaintiff should not have been allowed to introduce evidence of
such alleged waiver. It is submitted, therefore, that the doctrine of estoppel was
not applicable to the instant case. However keen the disappointment of the insured
may have been, nevertheless he was neither deceived nor misled.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT-COVENANT TO REPAIR-DuTY TO REMEDY PRIOR EXIsT-
INIG OPEN STAIRWAY.-The defendant leased a basement to be used as a pool room,
covenanting to "keep the building in repair during the term of the lease." The
lessee was damaged by the entrance of snow and sleet through an open stairway
which had been constructed prior to the lease. Held, that the plaintiff could
recover. Midkiff v. Benson (192i, Tex. Civ. App.) 235 S. W. 292.
It is well settled that there is no implied warranty of the condition of the prem-
ises by the lessor. Therefore the lessee, under ordinary conditions, cannot com-
plain that at the beginning of the tenancy the premises were not in a tenantable
condition, or that they were not adapted to the business for which they had been
leased. Kutchera v. Graft (192i, Iowa) 184 N. W. 297; Little Rock Ice Co. v.
Consumers' Ice Co. (1914) 114 Ark. 532, 170 S. W. 241; Valin v. Jewell (1914)
88 Conn. 151, go At. 36; 1 Tiffany, Real Property (192o ed.) 136. Consequently,
in the absence of an express covenant, the lessee cannot demand that the lessor
make any repairs in the premises which are necessitated by the peculiar nature
of the lessee's business. The obligation of the landlord to repair always rests
upon a covenant to that effect, and without such a covenant the landlord is neither
under a duty to make repairs, nor to pay for such repairs as may be made by the
tenant. Daggett v. Panebianco (1921, Neb.) 184 N. W. 177. When such a 
cove-
nant exists, notice of tbe want of repair is a condition precedent to the landlord's
duty. Marr v. Dieter (1921, Ga.) iog S. E. 532. It is essential, however, that a
distinction be made between cases where the lessee demands improvements of 
a
constructive nature, and where he merely wishes the premises to be kept wind and
water tight. Lovejoy v. Townsend (igoi) 25 Tex. Civ. App. 385, 61 S. W. 331.
Thus a lessor has been held to have been under no duty to strengthen the floors
and construct new girders because of the use to which the tenant had put the
demised building. Gregory v. Manhattan Briar Pipe Co. (igi6) 174 App. Div.
io6, 16o N. Y. Supp. 916. From the facts given in the principal case, it seems
that the basement entrance was not sufficiently well built to exclude the water
which was accustomed to accumulate in the area-way. Therefore, the lessor was
clearly under a duty to repair this entrance, and was liable for the loss suffered
by the plaintiff.
M UNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-INvALID CONTRACTS-RECOVERY IN QUASI-CON-
TRAcT.-During a conflagration which endangered the city of Atlanta, the fire chief,
at the instance of citizens, wrote out an order to the plaintiff company for Pyrene
fire extinguishers, which he then used in fighting the fire. The city later refusing
to pay, the plaintiff sued in alternate counts of contract or quasi-contract for
the value of the extinguishers. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover. Pyrene
Manufacturing Company v. City of Atlanta (1922, Ga. App.) IIo S. E. 408.
Three types of invalid contracts may result when dealing with a municipal
corporation. See NOTES (904) 4 COL. L. REv. 67; (igio) 9 MIcH. L. REv. 671.
The first is the truly ultra vires contract, where either the subject matter is
"beyond the power" of the city, or where the manner of making it is specifically
limited (as for example by bid). Gamewell Fire Alarm Co. v. City of Los
Angeles (1919, Calif.) 187 Pac. 63. The second is within the power of the city
to make in a specified way, which has not been complied with in some detail, not
the essence of the regulation. McGovern v. City ,of Chicago (917) 281 Ill. 264,
ni8 N. E. 3. The third is where a municipality which may contract in general,
with no manner specified, has done so irregularly (as, for example, by the mayor
alone, rather than by the city council). Cade v. Belington (1918) 82 W. Va. 613,
96 S. E. 1053. In the three classes, the courts are uniform in refusing a right of
action on the contract (except in the third, if later ratified), and they are equally
uniform in recoguizing a right of "restitution in specie." Staebler v. Town (i919)
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186 Ky. 124, 216 S. W. 348; Floyd County v. Allen (igio) 137 Ky. 575, 126
S. W. 124; 27 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1125, note. But as the latter generally does not
fully compensate the plaintiff, an action in quasi-contract is often attempted. Here
unanimity of judicial opinion ceases. Municipal corporations were early subject
to the same duties for benefits received as were individuals, so that recoveries in
quasi-contract were permitted in any of the three classes. Argenti v. City of San
Francisco (186o) I6 Calif. 256. Perhaps due to the nefarious character of certain
types of agreements, the courts changed their position, so that today in the first
class of cases a recovery in, quasi-contract is seldom permitted. Reams v. Cooley
(1915) 171 Calif. i5o, 152 Pac. 293; Ann. Cas. 1917 A 126o, note; (1920) 34
HARV. L. Ray. 439. In the second class of cases there is a growing minority
which grants a recovery in quasi-contract, for the reason that the policy of con-
trolling the city's contract power is obviously less endangered. For the same
reason, in the third class the greatest proportion of recoveries against the city in
quasi-contract is allowed. The plaintiff in the instant case ought to be able to
recover in quasi-contract from the individual citizens who used the extinguishers
to save their homes, arguing from the analogy of cases where goods have been
furnished a defendant at his request, in the mistaken belief of the existence of a
valid contract with him-here with a third person, the municipal corporation.
Vickery v. Ritchie (1909) 202 Mass. 247, 88 N. E. 835; 26 L. R. A. (N. s.) 8io,
note. But the plaintiff would have to sue innumerable defepdants-if he could find
them-and to recover in specie from the city would be to receive some empty
extinguishers, or their value when emptied. It is submitted that the policy reflected
in the increasing responsibility of a municipality for its torts should permit a
recovery in quasi-contract, on the usual principles of equity and good conscience,
where, as here, none of the elements which should bar recovery in any one of the
three classes exists. COMMENTS (1919) 29 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 911; NOTES
(1920) 20 COL. L. Rav. 772. It should certainly be permitted if the case is of
the second or third type, and perhaps it should be so even if it is of the first,
where the facts as here, show good faith, no attempt to overburden, the municipality,
a serious emergency which made the fire chief an agent by necessity, and undoubted
benefits received by the municipality through its citizens. See Frank v. Board of
Education (1917) 90 N. 3. 273, ioo Atl. 21i; Sheehan v. City (i9o2, Sup. Ct)
37 Misc. 432, 75 N. Y. Supp. 8o2.
RAILRoADs-ADVERSE POSSESSION-UsE OF PART OF PUBLIC HIGHwAY.-Under
a statute authorizing railroad companies to cross highways but imposing the duty
of restoring the highway "as near as may be to its former state so as not unneces-
sarily to impair its usefulness . . . . and as may be satisfactory to the Com-
missioners of highways of the town" in which the crossing was desired (N. Y.
Laws, 1848, ch. 195, sec. 5), the defendant, sixty years before, when the community
was rural, had built abutments for an overhead crossing and had continuously
paid taxes upon the land covered. The district became incorporated in the plain-
tiff city, which brought an action to compel the company to remove the abutments.
Held, that the defendant must remove the abutments. City of Mount Vernon v.
N. Y., N. H., & H. Ry. (1922) 232 N. Y. 309, 133 N. E. 900.
I By the weight of authority an individual or corporation cannot gain rights in
a -public highway or street by adverse user or possession; and, as a corollary,
public officers cannot without legislative authority confer such rights upon an
individual or corporation. Driggs v. Phillips (1886) 103 N. Y. 77, 8 N. E. 514;
Delaware, L. & W. Ry. v. City of Buffalo (1899) 158 N. Y. 266, 53 N. E. 44.
In many jurisdictions, however, including some which follow the above rule,
it is held that a municipal corporation may be estopped from asserting its rights
in a portion of a street where permanent improvements have been made or money
RECENT CASE NOTES 781
expended in reliance upon the acquiescence of municipal officers. City of Los
Angeles v. Cohn (1894) ioi Calif. 373, 35 Pac. ioo2; see 3 Dillon, Municipal
Corporations (5th ed. I9I1) sec. 1i94. This, inconsistency of position has been
justly criticised. Ralston v. Weston (1899) 46 W. Va. 544, 33 S. E. 326. New
York has avoided such an anomaly. The decision in the instant case thus depended
upon whether the company was authorized under the statute to erect and maintain
abutments within the limits of the highway. The language of the statute perhaps
implies that a railroad crossing may to some extent impair the usefulness of a
highway, and if the public necessities did not require a greater width of roadway
between the abutments than was left, the defendant seems to have complied with
the law. People v. N. Y., N. R. & H. Ry. (1882) 89 N. Y. 266; see 3 Elliott,
Railroads (3d ed. 1921) sec. 1577, note 88. The court held, however, first that the
statute did not authorize the company to appropriate permanently any part of the
highway for abutments; secondly, that the consent of the highway commissioners
was therefore immaterial; and thirdly, that even if the abutments ivere lawfully
erected in the first instance the duty of preserving the highway "in its former
state of usefulness" is a continuous one and a railroad, therefore, must make such
changes as are reasonably necessary for the increased needs of the public.
Although it is perhaps rather strained to hold that under this statute a railroad's
duty in regard to the character of crossing is enlarged pari passu with the public
necessity, the result accords with that reached by other courts in interpreting
similar, though more explicit, statutory or charter provisions. See 3 Elliott.
op. cit. secs. 1579, 158o.
WAsTE-AMELORATING WASTE-EFFEcT OF SHORT-TERm LEASE.-Without the
consent of the plaintiff, the owner of the building, the defendant, an assignee of
a lease expiring in January, 1932, made substantial alterations on the premises
which enhanced the value of the property. The plaintiff sought an injunction to
restrain waste and a mandatory injunction directing the defendant to restore the
premises to their original condition. Held, that the injunctions should issue.
McDonald v. O'Hara (1921, Sup. Ct.) 117 Misc. 517, 192 N. Y. Supp. 545.
Waste is the destruction or material alteration or deterioration of the freehold
or of the improvements forming a material part thereof, by any person rightfully
in possession but who has not the fee title or the full estate. Coke, Littleton, sec.
53a; Bee Bldg. Co. v. Peters Trust Co, (i92i, Neb.) 183 N. W. 302. It was the
rule at early common law that any material alteration of buildings on leased
premises by a tenant was waste even though the value of the property was increased
by the alterations. Cole v. Green (1682, K B.) i Lev. 309. There are dicta in
many modem cases to the same effect. See Hamburger & Dreyling v. Settegast
(igio) 62 Tex. Civ. App. 446, 131 S. W. 639; F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Nelson
(i92o, Ala.) 85 So. 449. It has been held that a provision in the lease allowing
the lessee to make alterations in the building did not privilege him to tear down
and destroy the building even though he proposed to substitute a better one.
Davenport v. Magoan (1884) 13 Or. 3, 4 Pac. 299. Where a life tenant began
to tear down a dwelling house with the professed object of replacing it with a
better building, alleging the dwelling as unfit for use, it was held that he would
be restrained from so doing since, as the court said, it was beyond its province
to inquire whether the tenant would ever replace it with a better, or as good a
building, or any building. A further reason assigned was that it might become
an impossibility for him to perform no matter how willing he might be. Dooly v.
Stringham (i885) 4 Utah, 107, 7 Pac. 405. The removal of a valueless building
by a life tenant has been held not to be an act of waste where owing to changed
conditions such removal was necessary for the profitable use of the property, but
it appears from the same case that a different view would be taken in the case
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of a tenant holding under a short-term lease. Meins v. Pabst Brewing Co. (1899)
104 Wis. 7, 79 N. W. 738. In England, the House of Lords refused to grant an
injunction restraining a tenant under a lease for 999 years from converting store
buildings into dwelling houses, the neighborhood having changed so as to do away
with'any demand for store buildings. Doherty v. Allman (1878, H. L.) L. R. 3
App. Cas. 7o9. But where, as in the instant case, there has been no permanent
change of conditions, or where the occupation of the premises is to be for a short
term only, it seems only proper to enjoin even ameliorating waste. The lease
merely gives the privilege to use the building and the landlord has the right to
receive back, at the end of the term, the very thing which he has leased. Agate v.
Lowenbein (1874) 57 N. Y. 604; Hamburger & Dreyling v. Settegast, supra;
Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., supra.
WmLs-EFFEcr OF A LAPsE OF PART OF T=E RESIDUARY ESTATF--The testatrix
directed that all the residue of her estate "including lapsed legacies" should be
divided among certain legatees in specified proportions. One of the legatees died
during the testatrix's lifetime. Held, that the legacy continued as part of the
residue and should be distributed to the survivors. Aitken v. Sharp (1922, N. J.)
115 Atl. 912.
It is well settled that a lapse of any portion of the residuary estate itself does
not inure to the benefit of the remaining residuary legatees but passes as if there
had been an intestacy. Gardner, Wills (1903) 419; Skrymnsher v. Northcote
(1818, Ch.) I Swanst 566; Lyman v. Coolidge (19oo) 176 Mass. 7, 56 N: E. 831.
This rule seems to have developed on account of a desire to effectuate the testator's
unexpressed intentions. 2 Jarman, Wills (6th ed. igio) 1056. The rule has been
severely criticised, however, and the theory upon which it is based seems fallacious.
It re Gray's Estate (1892) 147 Pa. 67, 23 At. 205; 2 Redfield, Wills (3d ed.
1876) i19; see In re Dunster [1909] i Ch. 103. Some courts, although advancing
no reasons, do not recognize it. Gray v. Bailey (1873) 42 Ind. 349; West v. West
(1883) 89 Ind. 529. And in at least one jurisdiction the rule has been changed
by statute. Woodward v. Congdon (1912) 34 R. I. 316, 83 Atl. 433. In general
it has been considerably restricted by holding it applicable only where the legatees
take as tenants in common, and not as joint tenants or as members of a class.
In re Dunster, supra; I Underhill, Wills (19oo) sec. 336. No jurisdiction applies
the rule if the testator's intention is expressed with sufficient certainty. Swallow
v. Swallow (1896) 166 Mass. 241, 44 N. E. 132; It re Palmer [1893, C. A.] 3 Ch.
369. The general rule was considered in the instant case, but the court considered
that the phrase "including lapsed legacies" showed the testatrix's intention that
all lapsed legacies, whether in the residue or not, should continue as part of the
residue and inure to the benefit of the surviving residuary legatees. Although
this phrase alone is a meagre basis for an inference that the testatrix actually
intended the result reached by the court's interpretation, nevertheless the decision
seems sound in that it limits the application of a rule which is technical in its
nature and of doubtful value.
